Dilemmas of Sustaining Parastatal Success: The Botswana Meat Commission by Morrison, Stephen




Parastatals play an important role in the political
economies of African states yet generally receive
negligible attention. Such neglect partly has practical
roots. Factors such as widespread mismanagement,
corruption and uncontrolled growth do little to make
data easily available. Added to these is the creed of the
sanctity of commercial information - a legitimate
concern for those enterprises actually engaged
competitively in fulfilling assigned commercial
functions.
But there is also something intrinsic to the social
scientific study of Africa itself which impoverishes
work on parastatals. Analysis of Africa has become,
with frightening monotony, an all-consuming effort at
explaining wholesale failure: failure of capitalism,
socialism or nationalism; failure of leadership; failure
of markets and statist market substitutes; failure to
skirt the perils of the international economy. It is the
explanation of this overall failure that preoccupies
many, if not most analysts.
Ironically, perceived wholesale failure, it seems,
provides fertile ground for elegant theorising. Witness
the appearance in recent years of the lean, powerful
and ultimately reductionist arguments presented
among others by Hart (1982), Hyden (1980), Bates
(1983), Jackson and Rosberg (1982), regarding the
failure of the state and the germination of crisis,
particularly in agriculture. These authors have
provided a list of alternative unilinear and all-
embracing explanations: failure lies in the state's
revenue imperative together with a recalcitrant mode
of production, in a continental 'economy of affection',
in the short term calculations of an urban-dominated
development coalition, or in the nature and form of
leadership in Africa.
Ten years previously, dependency and class formation
arguments were regarded by critics, of liberal and
Marxist persuasion alike, as fundamentally flawed by
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their simplicity. Today, however, most analysis is
comparably simplistic, rooted in an assumption of
gross failure and increasingly engaged, whatever the
doctrinal hue, in presenting what might be called
mono-theories of failure. Reality, it is assumed, is
sufficiently devoid of variation to make such an
enterprise viable. To admit a richer and more
complicated reality than one's work suggests is to run
the risk of making one's grand mono-theory less
convincing.
The study of parastatals has been swept into this style
of inquiry. Perceived gross failure has contributed to
gross over-generalisation. The literature presents a
common catalogue of motives underlying the initial
creation of parastatal bodies: to reduce dependence,
seize control from outside cartels, counter the absence
of a strong capitalist class, satisfy the state's revenue
imperative, the pressures of its bureaucratic elite, and
its need for symbolic achievement. Similarly
generalised outcomes are shown to follow: an initial
spasm of growth in the midst of scarcity, insecurity,
and management shortage; rapid distortion of the
parastatal's mission under the force of the imperatives
of bureaucratic accumulation and the attraction of
'monopoly rents'. Boundaries between state and
parastatal collapse, effectively eliminating from
discussion the important issue of management
autonomy and political accountability. In the
agricultural sphere, deformed monopoly structures
are shown to exploit their farmer clients in the service
of a more powerful coalition of bureaucrats, urban
industrialists, and mobilised urban masses.
Several consequences follow from this manner of
analysis. In the study of agriculture and parastatals,
cases of mixed results and relative success are
commonly overlooked. Moreover, the simplified
picture of failure becomes the basis for prescribing
equally simplified remedial policies for agricultural
improvement. This has been the case with the present
neo-liberal vogue of Berg [World Bank 1981] and
Bates [1983]; in their conception of failure, over-
whelmingly the central villain has become the state.
From this flows a virtually unilinear prescription for
success: rollback the state, liberate markets. No doubt
there is considerable truth to their arguments; all such
mono-theories of failure possess a persuasive core. Yet
all suffer from the empirical and analytical problems
outlined above, and seem unlikely to carry us very far
in genuinely understanding the nature of agricultural
success and state action in Africa. They are more likely
to remain fixed postures in academic and ideological
debates which run the risk of drifting into sterility.
It is crucial to understand the preconditions and
dynamics of success, and in particular the complex
contingencies of sustaining success. This task requires
a complementary dose of detailed analysis of success
in Africa. On a modest scale, the rest of this article will
attempt to begin such an exercise.
The Botswana Meat Commission (BMC)
The Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), a statutory
body createdjust prior to Independence in early 1966,
possesses control over 90 per cent of the purchase and
slaughter of the nation's cattle - the overwhelming
source of private wealth in Botswana - and
monopoly power over the export of meat. Its record
has been successful, as the following figures show.
Gross payout to producers has increased from 9.2 mn
Rand in 1970 to over 64 mn Pula in 1982, a remarkable
increase even after inflation is factored in. The unit
price paid to the producer has risen from R34.54 per
100 kgs (CDW) in 1969 to over P130 since 1982. The
number of cattle processed by the Commission has
risen from an annual average in the 1960s of less than
100,000 to over 230,000 each year since 1982.
Management has enjoyed considerable commercial
autonomy and unusual continuity at its higher levels.
Since the mid-1960s, management has directed two
successful technical transformations of the plant, the
more momentous change of the 1970s being of critical
importance in meeting disease and hygiene require-
ments of European markets. The plant's disciplined
and unionised labour force compares favourably with
international cost standards for production, and has
not staged an industrial action since immediately after
Independence in early 1967. Overall, technologically
and managerially, the plant has the most impressive
long term record of any such institution in
independent Africa.
Entry into the select, high price markets of the EEC
and South Africa rests partly upon broad political
factors, but beyond any doubt has been largely
initiated and sustained by the skill and aggressiveness
of the unusually autonomous Commission itself. Its
demonstrated technological competence aside, the
Commission management has institutionalised its
presence in each market through whole or partial
ownership of selling agencies and through the creation
of an enduring network of ties with foreign meat
import authorities and commercial meat interests
(retailers, cold stores, manufacturers).
The integrity and success of the parastatal has stood
behind the attraction into the Botswana cattle
economy of ever higher levels of foreign donor and
commercial support. The Commonwealth Develop-
ment Corporation (CDC), the original parent donor
of the BMC in the 1950s and early 1960s, drew British
commercial banks into the territory in colonial times,
and has continued to provide finance in the post-
colonial period. In the l970s and 1980s, the World
Bank, the EEC and various individual European
donor countries increased their assistance to the
capitalist cattle economy and, in DANIDA's case,
provided for the strategic individual in the BMC's
senior management who assumed responsibility for
the 1970s technical transformation and integration
into EEC markets.
The political preconditions for the establishment of
such a successful structure may be understood in terms
of the predominant development coalition which
arose to control the BMC. From the mid-1960s until
the early 1970s, that coalition consisted of the CDC
(via its Regional Controller in Johannesburg),
President Khama, a General Manager hired away in
1966 from the quickly decomposing Kenya Meat
Commission, and large commercial farmers.
Continuity of managerial authority and high
accountability to farmers stemmed from several
interrelated developments in the late colonial period.
The CDC, the parent donor of the abattoir, was the
predominant form of transnational capital. As a
developmental concessionary agency, it was prepared
from the late 1950s to abdicate outright control and
redefine its role to providing finance and managerial
expertise (until 1969). This shift was, however, on the
condition that relative managerial autonomy and
commercial principles were maintained and that the
South African meat magnate, Cyril Hurvitz, who from
the late 1950s had handled, with enormous profit,
most of the abattoir's external marketing and the
operation of a cannery, was decisively excluded.
The President, the late Sir Seretse Khama, actively
forged this pragmatic compromise which nationalised
the abattoir and retrieved control over profits from
outside interests while embedding the CDC's
neocolonial influence for several years after Indepen-
dence. The President also saw that farmer repre-
sentation on the Commission board continued to be
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dominated by large white farmers, in partnership with
wealthy Tswana aristocrats. His actions reflected a
broader political strategy: the skilful consolidation of
bi-racial elite partnerships at various levels - marital,
cattle interests, the Botswana Democratic Party.
Large white cattle traders/speculators were given an
increasing stake in the country in the run-up to
Independence - via the allocation of party and
Parliamentary positions, via white settlement schemes
on increasingly valuable Crown Lands - at the same
time that members of the black elite with cattle
enterprises found themselves deeply entwined with
established white commercial operators. Khama's
strategy would prove to be of enormous consequence
for the smooth transition to Independence, the
remarkable stability of Botswana's elite, and for the
firm elite farmer control over the nation's single most
important parastatal. The elite farming community
constituted at Independence one leg of the usually
cohesive, corporate-like control of the cattle industry;
elite farmers, small in number, with concentrated
ownership of the national herd and a history since
1950 of racially-fused institutional representation,
joined with the CDC, the president and management
in expelling outside control over marketing profits and
in maximising the parastatal's returns to farmers.
In the original development coalition, the state was
self-consciously excluded, out of the CDC's dread of
bureaucratic politicisation. The state could draw a
significant yet modest tax from the Commission, but
any further 'revenue imperatives' were blocked by the
pragmatism of the President, government dependence
upon the British for grants-in-aid until 1972, and the
CDC's oppositïon to any excessive diversion of
surplus. Nor in the early days did state officials hold
any authority to influence events internal to the
Commission. In statute and in practice, BMC policy
was the protected realm of the CDC Chairman, the
General Manager, and select fârmer representatives;
under exceptional circumstances the President could
himself legally intervene.
A significant redefinition of the coalition took place in
the early to mid- 1970s, as the President's own political
outlook grew more progressive and less neocolonial,
as Botswana's bureaucratic-managerial state began to
acquire institutional and financial authority, as
integration into the EEC concentrated the state elite's
imagination, and as new categories of black farmers
(state officials, or members of marketing cooperatives)
began to press their interests against those of the large
white speculators. The CDC's authority waned
sharply (it surrendered control over the Chairmanship
in 1969) the Commission's formal links with organised
white farmers were severed, and a new General
Manager was installed directly beholden to the
President's new priorities. These were: that the plant
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be prepared for European market integration; that
pricing and quota policy be revised to make room for
cooperatives and the emergent bureaucratic Tswana
elite; that internally the Commission should begin to
shed cruder evidence of racist employment practices,
and that direct ministerial representation be esta-
blished, linking the Commission and its policies to
Agriculture, the President's Office, and later Finance.
The Heavy Incumbency of Success
The logic of commercial management under the I 970s
development coalition was simple; it was essential to
spend a lot of money to reap the eventual, sweet
returns of EEC markets. The lean practices of
previous management were inappropriate; short term
sacrifices for the sake of plant modernisation and
market integration were required of producers to
ensure long term advance. Management, above all
other actors, insisted on the freedom to design and
execute such a plan.
Developments during 1974.-82 seemed in large
measure to validate this rationale. As one would
expect, in the period 1974-78 the percentage of gross
sales returned to the producer dropped by 19.3 per cent
(73.7 to 54.4) while the growth of the unit price paid to
the producer slowed very dramatically (see Table 1,
column F and G; Table 2, column C). Considerable
capital was diverted to plant modernisation, the
upgrading of selling and distribution operations, and
to capital and revenue reserves. These trends, it must
be noted, were exaggerated by the outbreak of foot
and mouth disease in late 1977. In a subsequent phase,
1979-82, management succeeded, even while under the
continued stress of disease problems, in achieving
considerable annual unit price rises and in increasing
the percentage of gross returns delivered to the
producer.
Curiously, however, these achievements began to
erode quite seriously in the 1980s, just when
expectations of ever higher levels of success seemed
most justified. From mid-1981, foot and mouth
disease was brought under control; annual slaughter
rose well above 200,000 head; promising new markets
in continental Europe were opened and exploited by
the Commission's aggressive overseas marketing.
Yet grave problems appeared. From 1981 to 1984,
while the Commission increased its gross returns by
36.6 mn Pula, the producer received a meagre 25.4 per
cent of that increase (9.3 mn Pula). For the first few
years, emerging difficulties were somewhat shielded
from view; in 1981 and 1982 the Commission could
continue substantially to increase the unit price paid to
producers largely on the basis of price stabilisation
funds derived from a 1979 windfall. By 1983-84, such
cushions had diminished and indications of real
trouble became forcefully apparent. An endpoint of
sorts was reached in 1984 when gross income and unit
price dropped, returns to the producer slid to less than
50 per cent of gross sales, while the stabilisation fund
bottomed out.
Politically, these trends triggered abrupt attacks upon
Commission management in early 1985. The bargain
struck under the second development coalition, for a
long time a topic of casual elite debate, began to
unravel with cumulative force as it appeared that
management had failed to deliver the second half of
the bargain, namely the sweet benefits of high-return
markets. Members of Parliament publicly debated
charges of mismanagement and corruption and called
for an official commission of enquiry. The Botswana
Executive Chairman, at the centre of the political heat,
resigned in disgrace.
How can we explain these recent developments, given
the Commission's rather impressive prior history?
With what relative weight can the decline of success -
the Commission's extreme difficulty in satisfying the
bargain and sustaining success - be attributed to the
various factors typically thought to plague agriculture
in Africa: increased state intervention (under the
second development coalition), environmental con-
straints, the influence of international market trends,
the internal dynamics of the Commission itself
(bureaucratic accumulation, self-interest, excessive
autonomy, the behaviour of the development
coalition via the BMC Board)? Such questions
demand extensive treatment which I cannot provide
here; nonetheless, I shall briefly summarise the main
factors.
(i) Environment
For over three years now, drought has inflicted ever
harsher punishments upon the cattle economy and the
nation as a whole, imposing severe contingencies upon
the Commission. Average Cold Dressed Mass, the
indicator of the saleable meat yield per carcase, has
dropped 29 kgs during 1981-84 (from 217 to 188); i.e.
the climate has radically reduced the material which
the expensive plant must process in order to justify
itself. Management claims that in 1984 this meant a
financial loss of P12 mn, of which Pl I mn could have
been passed to the producer. Even discounting for
management exaggeration, there was still a substantial
loss in earnings over which no conceivable control
could be exerted.
The pressure of drought has also raised the incidence
of measles in the cattle population (from 8.6per cent in
1980 to over 17 per cent in 1985) effectively
invalidating, for that proportion of the nation's
product, the expensive technology set in place to
produce chilled meat for European export. Through
1984, measly meat had to be frozen and sold at lower
returns, with a loss in 1984 of approximately PS mn.
Market restrictions worsened in 1985: much if not
most of the measly meat will have to go into cans, at a
loss of P3-4 mn.
Drought, disease and the environment interact in
other curious ways to impose new costs upon the
BMC. The foot and mouth outbreaks of the late 1 970s,
which forced state investment of over P4 mn in new
fencing to meet EEC requirements, raised anxiety
within the technocratic circles of the Finance Ministry
that subsidies to the cattle industry had grown
excessive. A subsequent official enquiry and several
donor missions echoed that theme, with strongly
worded advice that taxation upon the Commission be
increased, and donor suggestions that such a change
might become a condition of future aid. While thus far
that sentiment has not translated into higher direct
taxation of the Commission, or forestalled donor
assistance, it has hardened government attitudes
towards tax relief on the BMC's development
expenditure.
The erection of new fences also upset the local and
international wildlife lobby, particularly when at
points in the late 1970s and the 1980s the combined
effect of drought and fences was to stage spectacular
die-offs at single locations (e.g. 150,000 wildebeests at
Lake Xau in 1983). Suddenly, the BMC and the state
in general found the cattle economy identified as the
most important culprit in destroying Botswana's
wildlife. While neither the state nor the BMC
possessed a coherent wildlife policy to defend itself,
the European lobby held the potential to disrupt the
status quo by questioning EEC policy towards
Botswana and campaigning against purchase of BMC
meat. As it is, the EEC link has not been overtly
affected (Lome III, concluded in late 1984, preserves
the status quo marketing access), yet the BMC refers in
its 1984 Annual Report to recent costly difficulties
posed by the wildlife lobby as the BMC sought to
market its meat in Europe.
(ii) External Markets: Spend Money to Make
Money?
Strains within EEC markets associated with drought
and wildlife have been minor compared with other
trends. Strategic entry into the EEC was predicated on
the assumption that market prices would continue to
be extremely high relative to 'world market' prices,
enough to justify investment in an elaborate selling
machinery. In recent years, the costs of operations
have proven far heavier than anyone ever anticipated,
while EEC markets have proved increasingly soft and
contradictory. Strategic entry to the EEC has been a
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very mixed blessing indeed; once immersed, moreover,
it becomes terribly difficult to retreat. Costs may rise,
benefits may drop, political dissatisfaction may grow,
yet the alternative of exit - casting one's fate to the
uncertainties of world markets - remains daunting.
Success quickly begins to resemble failure, but where
to turn?
In the late 1970s, BMC management with minimal
reference to the state or producer representatives on
the Board pursued its international marketing strategy
single-handedly. This aggressive approach to implant-
ing a BMC presence in EEC markets proved highly
viable in its first years. As the 1980s advanced,
however, costs escalated sharply. The investment in
market integration had begun to backfire; by 1983-84,
it began to reduce returns to the producer. BMC
selling and distribution expenses, the overwhelming
proportion oriented to the EEC, rose from an annual
average of P2mn (1970-74) to P7.6 mn (1974-78) to
P17.4 mn (1981-84) - (see Table 2 for full data). In
1983 and 1984 such annual costs exceeded P2Omn,
while at the same time operations outside Lobatse,
namely those in the UK and Europe, began to register
significant administrative and processing costs for the
first time (P2.71 mn in 1983, P2.86 mn in 1984: see
Table 3 column 7).
The costliness of the market chase reflected the
character of the desired markets themselves. Manage-
ment saw the strength of the UK market wane in
1982-83, reflecting the deepening stasis of the British
economy. Existing structures in the UK had to be
maintained as the hunt proceeded out onto the
continent; exposure and cumulative costs deepened.
Moreover, general EEC price levels suffered as the
EEC confronted the massive contradictions of its own
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
(iii) Production, Processing and Administration:
The Bureaucratic Swell
Erosion of returns to farmers came with equal, if not
greater force locally at the Lobatse plant. Costs rose
tenfold between 1973 and 1984. The transformation of
the plant in the mid-1970s had left an enormously
complex and cumbersome deposit. These increases far
outstripped any rise in the number of cattle processed,
as they also increasingly ran ahead of rises in the gross
value of sales. The average percentage of the gross
taken by Lobatse's production, processing and
administration was 11.2 per cent in 1974-78; by
1980-84 it had grown to 17.8 per cent (see Tables 2 and
3).
Greatest excess lay in the realm of administrative staff.
From an average of P1.25 mn 1975-78, administrative
costs grew to P4.26 mn in the years 198 1-84. Such was
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the cost of providing salaries and prerequisites to a
staff whose numbers ran out of control from the late
l970s on. Administrative staff numbered 164 in 1976,
182 in 1977, 253 in 1979, 434 in 1984.
The process whereby local pressures began to draw off
ever increasing bureaucratic benefits from the
parastatal, with very little, if anything, to show in
return in terms of added productivity, arose from
several interrelated developments. Of greatest
importance was the transition from expatriate
managerial control to control by the local elite. After
over two decades of stalled advance for the majority of
Botswana employed at the racially stratified Com-
mission, a function of the neocolonial and authori-
tarian form of control which persisted well into the
1970s, the powers of Executive Chairman and
Administrative General Manager were handed to
Botswana in the late 1970s with the expectation that
the status quo could easily be maintained. On
structural grounds alone, the transition away from
neocolonialism was bound to be highly problematic
and convulsive. Historically, control had centred on
the parastatal's linchpin, its authoritarian white
manager. Past success had rested upon this
unattractive reality; movement away from it via late
or delayed localisation, a familiar feature of
Botswana's institutional landscape - set the stage for
a swelling of the bureaucracy and for the eventual
instabilities now seen at the top management levels of
the BMC. Such an outcome, it would seem, could only
have been averted by the insertion at the summit of an
extraordinarily tough and locally unsympathetic
individual. As it was, that did not occur.
Botswana's rapid urbanisation, its frustrations in
translating diamond wealth into growth of employ-
ment, the decline of employment in South African
mines - all of these general circumstances in the late
1970s/early 1980s heightened the pressure felt by the
BMC and other parastatals to become more elastic in
their willingness to employ. Added to these were the
state's policies on unions and incomes, factors which
undermined BMC management's traditional instru-
ments for control of its labour force and contributed in
the end to the reclassification of scores of workers
from wage labour status to that of administrative staff.
In the early 1970s, government pressed for recognition
of the union at the BMC. As the mining economy came
of age, government and mining transnationals were of
the opinion that unionisation was a useful instrument
for maintenance of order within the emergent
industrial force. BMC management, after having
crushed the union during the 1967 strike and resisted
organisation well into the 1970s, accepted a union,
granting it formal recognition in 1975. In interaction
with the expatriate General Manager until 1977, the
union was, as one official put it, 'killed with kindness'.
Following 1977, it grew in membership and
aggressiveness, particularly as labourers began to feel
the onus of the state's income policy, a policy which
from the late 1970s began seriously to limit
management's ability to grant annual pay rises and
assorted traditional perquisites. Management saw one
path out of its mounting confrontations with
organised labour, a loophole by which many workers
could be elevated into the administrative staff
category where income, perquisites, and life chances
all improved dramatically. So too did the cost to the
producer.
Ironically, the state inadvertently contributed to the
ever greater bloat of the administration as it sought to
contain the growth of incomes and rein in the
managerial autonomy of the BMC and other
parastatals. The ensuing situation was no less
paradoxical. Once persons had gained access to the
BMC payroll, it became a delicate matter for the state
leadership to imagine intervening to retrench
considerable numbers. BMC employees are an urban
population, ethnically predominantly Bangwaketse,
two criteria defining the character of the major
opposition party (the Botswana National Front)
which in late 1984 demonstrated a surprising surge of
strength in council and Parliamentary elections. The
BMC ward of Lobatse, after two decades of voting
Botswana Democratic Party, the incumbent majority
party, threw its support to the National Front, while
Lobatse's council and Parliamentary seat remained
under BDP control. Lobatse is today one of the few
remaining towns not to defect from the BDP; for the
state elite to retrench workers or employees is to run
the risk of seeing Lobatse further alienated and
possibly lost. Politically the situation existed before
the 1984 elections; the depth of the dilemma is
certainly more striking today.
The bureaucracy of the parastatal was not the sole
source of internal difficulty, however. The plant
changed structurally from the mid-l970s, with mixed
consequences. Its central processing functions were
transformed and expanded; the Maun abattoir was
imposed on the Commission for non-commercial
reasons (to relieve the N'gamiland population in a
context of drought and disease), with substantial
losses since opening in 1983. New structures were
created: a cannery, tannery, pet food factory and an
effluent treatment plant. Employment rose by over
200 persons, and these additional installations
required a heavier diversion of internal resources than
in the past. Total capital and revenue reserves in the
years 1971-75 averaged R4.9 mn; for the years 1979-84
the figure had risen to P 18.6 mn. In percentage terms,
that sum accounted on average for over one fifth of
yearly gross sales.
Capital committed to these new schemes exceeded
P13 mn. The moment of reckoning, however, was
slightly delayed, as projects slowly came on stream.
When that moment did finally arrive in the l980s, it
demonstrated that many, if not most of the projects
had become serious liabilities. The slaughter floor had
been expanded to 1,800 head per day in the late 1970s,
yet owing to disease control provisions and the lack of
balance between the slaughter floor and the plant's
other functions, that expensive new capacity remained
underutilised; daily processing normally did not
exceed 1,200. By BMC internal accounts, total losses
for the cannery and tannery were P5.7mn, losses
overwhelmingly concentrated in the 1980s. Maun
required a subsidy of over Pl mn per year from 1983,
the effluent plant proved a techiwlogical fiction, and
at a cost of Pl mn, the pet food factory amounted to a
technical toy of apparently little benefit.
Did these losses signal that the state had begun
subordinating farmers' interests to those of a local
elite with urban, industrial concerns, as many analysts
would lead one to expect? Generally, the answer is no.
The state did alter the environment within which the
BMC operated, introducing new constraints and
costs, but not in the pattern commonly described. The
state imposed the Maun abattoir to bring benefits to
the rural north west; it insisted that action be taken to
treat plant waste following two decades of serious
environmental abuse by the BMC; it applied pressure
upon the BMC to diversify for the sake of the
technocratic goals of employment and deepening of
export processing. The state did not, however, force
the BMC to sell its unfinished products to subsidiaries
at below external market values. Nor did it have any
serious involvement in the selection of a foreign
tannery partner, the choice of effluent treatment
technology and the creation of a pet food factory;
these were all management decisions of highly dubious
quality with significant consequences.
BMC management took full control of these various
structural projects, self-consciously aiming to preserve
its institutional autonomy. The state acceded to this
arrangement, and for that reason does not bear major
responsibility for mounting losses. Pricing formulae
remained management's prerogative; in reality, that
autonomy probably served to conceal deeper losses
than acknowledged formally. Management's interests
politically and financially were to minimise formal
losses, something easily accomplished over the short
term by varying internal costing formulae.
In management's defence, two other dimensions must
be noted. The state's demeanour was not altogether
technocratic. One ministerial official with close ties to
the President did succeed in insinuating himself into
the tannery, acquiring control over the supply of the
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plant's tanning agents and contributing substantially
from the early 1980s to the decline of the tannery's
accounts. Such abuse, it turned out, was reversible;
this official, while not removed, was forced to return
prices to previous levels, which was accomplished by
throwing the weight of price adjustment upon his
South African suppliers.
Secondly, structures like the cannery provide a form of
insurance against market shifts and internal disease
difficulties. Any judgements must be made with
consideration ofthe difficult and fluid environment in
which they operate. The decision to construct the
cannery was made in the midst of the foot and mouth
outbreaks of the late 1970s; as these problems
subsided in the 1980s, it was logical to expect that the
cannery would become a burden of sorts. Yet that
burden itself began to diminish as the mid-1980s
difficulties of drought and measles began to require
greater use of the cannery.
Conclusions
Gross failure may summon elegant explanations, yet
obviously the task of sustaining success is neither
Table I
BMC: Major Statistics
simple nor easy. For the rather remarkable, divergent
outcomes like the BMC, grave obstacles to continued
success arise from a complex plurality of sources.
Some of these are familiar and resonant with other less
impressive cases in Africa: the variability and crushing
impact of the environment, progressive administrative
bloat, the ethnic and political binds posed by
entrenched workers and administrative staff. In other
important respects, the formula for past success itself
seems increasingly the formula for future decline:
achieving and sustaining success is remarkably
slippery. Ever deepening commitment to EEC market
integration brings diminishing returns, while it results
in runaway growth of costs in operations outside the
home country's borders, beyond effective surveillance
and control by farmers and state technocrats. High
managerial autonomy, relative insulation from the
state, create over time an elaborate and complex
institutional apparatus only dimly understood by
members of the development coalition theoretically
responsible for its political management. Institutional
growth begins to invalidate rational control by a
development coalition of this 'state within a state', at
the very time when the multiple difficulties encountered
by the BMC demand sophisticated and coordinated
reactions.
CDW: Cold Dressed Weight, average kgs per carease.
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1966 132,232 3,350 R8.6 mn 184 13.2 R28.78 -
1967 88,535 7,316 R12.3 mn 213 14.9 R3l.83 10.5%
1968 103,776 32,416 Rll.6mn 226 10.7 R33.84 6.3%
1969 93,074 34,960 R 10.2 mn 227 9.5 R34.54 2.0%
1970 127,317 33,786 Rl3.8 mn 208 8.1 R25.68 (25.7%)
1971 167,180 41,869 Rl7.lmn 197 7.3 R36.32 41.4%
1972 156,510 22,934 R22.6 mn 210 7.7 R46.34 27.6%
1973 209,443 8,707 R36.l mn 194 8.5 R55.97 20.8%
1974 186,041 58,745 R38.Omn 202 8.6 R73.l4 30.7%
1975 188,440 21,554 R41.9 mn 210 7.4 R68.72 (6.0%)
1976 211,987 8,127 P53.9mn 205 7.8 P69.79 1.6%
1977 196,550 5,433 P53.2mn 208 8.1 P75.31 7.9%
1978 149,346 763 P39.9mn 204 7.6 P71.11 5.6%
1979 228,961 747 P91.3 mn 206 9.2 P82.05 15.4%
1980 140,783 507 P51.4 mn 203 8.6 P96.71 17.9%
1981 202,001 520 P83.3mn 217 11.0 P114.40 18.3%
1982 237,135 598 P107.6 mn 200 13.0 P134.94 18.0%
1983 233,135 7,509 P1l9.Smn 195 14.2 P137.75 2.1%
1984 239,283 16,181 P119.9mn 188 16.0+ P130.54 (5.2%)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Year Throughput Gross Cattle % Average %
Cattle Smalistock income CD W' Measles Price Per Change from
(kgs) 100 kg. prior year
Table 2
BMC: Distribution of Income Shares'
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Year Total Amount paid to Production pro- Selling and Taxes paid
Sales producer cessing and admini- distribution costs (% total)
Income (% total) strative costs (% total)
(% total)
1970 13.8 9.2 (66.7) 1.2 (8.7) 1.9 (13.6) 0.9 (6.3)
Figures not in parentheses indicate for the years 1970-75 millions of Rand, for 1976-84 millions of Pula.
Source: BMC Annual Reports
Figures indicate Rand (mn) 1974-75, Pula (mn) 1976-84
2 Figure is for the first nine months of 1984 only
Sources: BMC Annual Reports and Internal Accounts
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1971 17.1 12.1(70.8) 1.7(10.2) 2.1(12.5) 1.2(6.8)
1972 22.6 15.1 (66.8) 1.8 (7.8) 3.0 (13.4) 1.6 (7.2)
1973 36.1 26.5 (74.4) 2.5 (6.8) 4.8 (13.4) 2.8 (7.7)
1974 38.0 28.0 (73.7) 2.8 (7.3) 3.3 (8.6) 3.0 (7.9)
1975 41.9 27.4 (65.4) 4.3 (10.3) 8.0 (19.2) 3.2 (7.6)
1976 53.4 31.8 (59.6) 5.6 (10.3) 8.6 (15.9) 4.8 (8.9)
1977 53.2 30.8 (57.9) 6.6 (12.5) 11.1 (20.9) 4.5 (8.4)
1978 39.9 21.7 (54.4) 6.2 (15.5) 7.2 (18.1) 3.3 (8.3)
1979 91.3 45.2 (49.5) 9.7(10.7) 13.8 (15.1) 8.5 (9.3)
1980 51.4 26.6 (53.7) 10.7 (20.7) 7.4 (14.4) 3.9 (7.7)
1981 83.3 50.2 (60.3) 14.3 (17.2) 11.5 (13.8) 7.8 (9.4)
1982 107.6 64.1 (59.6) 16.6 (15.4) 17.4 (16.2) 9.8 (9.1)
1983 119.5 63.4 (53.1) 23.0 (19.2) 20.0 (16.8) 10.9 (9.1)
1984 119.9 59.5 (49.6) 25.3 (21.1) 20.6 (17.2) 10.8 (9.1)
Table 3
BMC: Production, Processing and Administration Costs'
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Year Total costs: BMC Administrative Lobatse Security Overseas Administrative
Production, Costs: Holding and Lobatse and Processing Costs:
Processing and
Administrative
Lobatse Loading BMC (UK, W. Germany,
Holland)
1974 2.76 mn - - -
1975 4.33 mn 1.03 mn 0.60 mn 0.06 mn -
1976 5.57mn 1.17mn 0.67mn 0.10mn -
1977 6.63mn 1.40mn O.68mn 0.10mn -
1978 6.18mn 1.40mn 0.74mn 0.12mn
1979 9.72 mn 2.33 mn 0.83 mn 0.16 mn -
1980 10.65 mn 3.28 mn 0.88 mn 0.20 mn -
1981 14.28mn 4.33mn 1.20mn 0.21 mn 0.15mn
1982 16.56 mn 4.24 mn 2.21 mn 0.22 mn 0.22 mn
1983 22.96 mn 3.64 mn 2.03 mn n.a. 2.71 mn
1984 25.29 mn 4.85 mn2 1.07mn2 n.a. 2.86 mn
Table 4
BMC: Source of Losses
The Grazier Scheme, a programme by which the BMC financed the purchase of cattle for finishing by private individuals, ran into
serious difficulties; by the early l980s several million Pula were overdue, the major proportion owed by a handful of politically
prominent individuals. Collection has proceeded slowly. At the end of 1984, P1.2 mn was still outstanding. Figures in this
column indicate the administrative cost of the programme.
2 1984 figures are for January to September
Source; BMC InternalAccounts
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1976 44,548 64,308
1977 - 44,317 52,182
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1979 (+1,249,502) (+26,46 1) 23,228 149,456
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